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Understanding the "Original Source Exception" to the False
Claims Act's "Public Disclosure Bar" in Light of the
Supreme Court's Ruling in Rockwell v. United States
Joel D. Hesch*t
I. INTRODUCTION
The False Claims Act (FCA) is one of the fastest growing areas of
federal litigation due to its unique qui tam enforcement mechanism.'
The FCA is the federal government's primary anti-fraud tool for re-
covering ill-gotten gains from companies submitting false claims for
payments to more than twenty government agencies or programs,
such as Medicare and the military.2 As much as two hundred billion
dollars of taxpayer funds are likely lost each year to these false
claims.3
Because the government is unable to recover much of these funds
without the help of whistleblowers, Congress, by means of the FCA,
provides for a "relator" to bring a qui tam action against a person or
company on behalf of the government and receive a share of the re-
covery, plus attorney fees, from the defendant.4 Since the FCA was
* Joel D. Hesch is an Assistant Professor of Law, Liberty University School of Law. From
1990 through 2006, Mr. Hesch worked in the Civil Fraud Section of the Department of Justice in
Washington, D.C., the office responsible for nationwide administration of the qui tam provisions
of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2000). He handled numerous qui tam cases
throughout the nation, including the trial aspects of Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 127 S.
Ct. 1397 (2007). He is the author of WHISTLEBLOWING: A GUIDE TO GOVERNMENT REWARD
PROGRAMS (2008) and Restating the "Original Source Exception" to the False Claims Act's "Pub-
lic Disclosure Bar," 1 LIBERTY U.L. REV. 111, 116-117 (2006).
t A special note of thanks is given to Mr. Hesch's research assistant and Liberty University
law student, Ms. Charis Mitchell, who provided valuable assistance in the researching and writ-
ing of this article.
1. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2000). "Qui tam is short for 'qui tam pro domino
rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur,' which means 'who pursues this action on our Lord
the King's behalf as well as his own."' Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1397,
1403 n.2 (2007).
2. Avco Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 884 F.2d 621, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Under the FCA, the
defendant must pay triple damages and civil penalties for each false claim. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a).
3. See S. REP. No. 99-345, at 3 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5268 ("The
Department of Justice has estimated fraud as draining 1 to 10 percent of the entire Federal
budget."). Based upon current spending of $2.5 trillion, the annual amount of fraud ranges from
$25 to $250 billion.
4. The FCA permits a private person, known as a "relator," to file and participate in qui tam
lawsuits on behalf of the government and share in a percentage of the recovery as a reward, plus
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modernized in 1986 to allow more relators to participate,5 the United
States Department of Justice has recovered over twenty billion dollars
under the FCA from companies that cheated on government contracts
or programs and paid more than two billion dollars in rewards to citi-
zens who filed such qui tam suits.6 Many companies dislike the FCA
which potentially pays its employees millions of dollars to report
fraud. 7
The most contested aspect of a qui tam suit is whether the relator is
entitled to file and participate in the qui tam action. Defendants' prin-
cipal attack arises under the FCA's "public disclosure bar,"'8 which is
triggered when fraud allegations are in the public domain before a
relator files suit.9 If the bar applies, the relator must prove that he
meets the "original source exception"'10 or his claims will be dismissed.
attorney fees from the defendant. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)-(2). Accordingly, the caption of FCA
cases include both the United States and the relator as "ex rel." as the plaintiffs, i.e. United
States ex rel. John Doe v. XYZ, Corp.
5. For over a century, Congress and the courts have wrestled with the issue of how wide the
doorway should be for relators who wish to receive rewards for reporting fraud. The FCA was
enacted in 1863 by President Lincoln to combat rampant fraud occurring in the midst of the Civil
War. See Joel D. Hesch, Restating the "Original Source Exception" to the False Claims Act's
"Public Disclosure Bar," 1 LIBERTY U.L. REV. 111, 116-17 (2006). In 1943, the FCA was
amended in order to prevent claims where any of the information about the fraud was already in
the public knowledge. Id. Unfortunately, this effectively closed the door on most relators. In
1986, Congress again amended the FCA, easing the restrictions on relators when some informa-
tion about the fraud is already in the public domain, opening the door and inviting relators to
come forward. Id.
6. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT RECOVERS $2 BILLION FOR FRAUD AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENT IN FY 2007; MORE THAN $20 BILLION SINCE 1986 (2007), http://www.usdoj.gov/
opa/pr/2007/November/07civ_873.html. Over sixty percent of all fraud cases pursued by the De-
partment of Justice arise from qui tam actions. Id.
7. Technically, the FCA does not require that the government establish fraud; it is a violation
of the FCA when the defendant acted with either "actual knowledge," "deliberate ignorance,"
or "reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information." 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b). Section
3729(b) further provides that in establishing a claim, "no proof of specific intent to defraud is
required." Id. This Article uses the term "fraud" in place of "a violation of the FCA" for
readability.
8. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
9. It is the defendant, in most instances, who moves to dismiss the relator. See infra note 13.
The relator is often an employee or former employee, someone who asked the company to stop
committing fraud but was rebuffed or fired for failing to go along with the company's scheme. Id.
In Rockwell, the government did not contest that the relator, Mr. Stone, a former employee of
Rockwell, was entitled to his share of the reward. See Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 127
S. Ct. 1397, 140, 1409-12 (2007).
10. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B). Under the False Claims Act, if the relator's allegations had
been publicly disclosed prior to filing his qui tam complaint, his claim must be dismissed unless
he meets the original source exception of the statute. Id. The FCA defines "original source" as a
person with direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are
based. Id.
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Despite the fundamental importance of the FCA, the Supreme
Court has rarely accepted FCA cases for review. However, the Court
granted certiorari in Rockwell v. United States to resolve a circuit
splitl and determine whether the Tenth Circuit misapplied the statu-
tory definition of an "original source" in interpreting the original
source exception.' 2 In Rockwell, the Court addressed for the first time
the requirements of the original source exception in light of the FCA's
public disclosure bar.
Rockwell, the company being sued under the FCA, argued that the
relator, Mr. Stone, was ineligible for a reward.' 3 Stone's law firm initi-
ated the FCA case, spent nearly ten million dollars in attorney fees,
and acted as co-counsel in the six-week jury trial that resulted in a
verdict against Rockwell.' 4 In the Supreme Court's decision, the ma-
jority sided with Rockwell, stating that Mr. Stone did not meet the
original source exception based on the actual wording of the statute.
15
Thus, the government could not pay him a reward under the FCA,
and Rockwell would not pay the attorney fees to which Mr. Stone, if
deemed a proper relator, was otherwise entitled.'
6
Because this is the only Supreme Court decision addressing the
FCA's original source exception, the impact and scope of this decision
upon future qui tam cases is critically important. This article begins by
discussing the Rockwell decision and the issues it resolved, including
the likely implications and anticipated effects upon future FCA
11. For a comprehensive discussion regarding the circuits' multiple tests, see Hesch, supra
note 5, at 122-25.
12. The question presented to the Rockwell court was: "Whether the Tenth Circuit erred by
affirming the entry of judgment in favor of a qui tam relator under the False Claims Act, based
on a misinterpretation of the statutory definition of an 'original source' set forth in 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(e)(4)?" Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, No. 05-1272, 2006 WL 886721(U.S. April 4.
2006).
13. See supra note 9. Because the author was also one of the government trial attorneys han-
dling the case and thus has substantial first-hand knowledge of the facts of the case, additional
facts are included in this article that are not included in the Supreme Court's opinion in order to
give a fuller picture of the case to aid the reader. See infra notes 28, 29, 30, 41, 44, 49, 50, and 52.
Specifically, the author began working on the case in 1990, when he joined the Department of
Justice, through 2006, when he left government service. During that time, he participated in all
aspects of the case, including investigating the allegations, recommending that the government
intervene in the case, conducting numerous depositions, and preparing pleadings and motions. In
addition, because the author worked on FCA qui tam cases at the Department of Justice for over
15 years, he has substantial knowledge of the workings of the FCA and DOJ practices and pro-
cedures. Accordingly, he provides information based upon his knowledge of FCA practices and
procedures to give a fuller picture of how FCA cases are handled to aid the reader. See infra
notes 91, 107, 137, 142, and 143.
14. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1409-10.
15. Id.
16. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (d)(1)-(2).
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cases.17 Next, it addresses the key issues concerning the original
source exception not addressed by the Supreme Court.'8 Finally, con-
sidering the Court's absence of guidance on key aspects of the original
source exception and the resultant continued disagreement among the
federal circuits, this article proposes a framework for courts to adopt
when evaluating the original source exception. This framework should
produce uniform results while remaining true to the text and pur-
poses of the qui tam provisions.19 The article packages these standards
into a workable framework for original source disputes, creating a
gateway tool for courts to follow to ensure consistency, efficiency, and
accuracy in rulings.20
II. THE ROCKWELL DECISION
In Rockwell, Mr. Stone, the relator, conceded that the facts underly-
ing the allegations in his qui tam case had been publicly disclosed. He
thus relied solely upon the legal argument that he met the original
source exception to the public disclosure bar.2' Writing for the major-
ity, Justice Scalia devoted nearly half of the opinion to articulating the
details of Mr. Stone's case, demonstrating that the analysis in this
case, and any other original source case, is fact driven.2 2 After outlin-
ing the complex factual scenario, the Court addressed several jurisdic-
tional issues and the application of the original source exception to the
case.
Because the facts are necessary to understand the Court's decision
and how the original source exception was applied to the case, this
article discusses the detailed facts before fully analyzing the decision
and the resulting implications for future cases.
A. The Facts Underlying Rockwell
Rockwell International Corporation (Rockwell) was under contract
with the Department of Energy (DOE) to manage and operate the
government's nuclear weapons plant in Colorado.23 A substantial por-
17. See infra Parts II and III.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. The author's prior article articulated a standard for the original source exception prior to
the Rockwell decision. See Hesch, supra note 5, at 152-54. This article refines the proposed stan-
dard and framework for courts to use when facing original source issues.
20. See infra Part IV.C.
21. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1405.
22. Due to the highly unusual facts in this case, the Court did not have a clear opportunity to
establish the much-needed standard to resolve the circuit split over key aspects of the original
source exception. See id. at 1410-12.
23. Id. at 1401.
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tion of Rockwell's compensation under that contract came from
"award fees," contingent upon Rockwell's satisfactory performance in
areas concerning environmental, safety, and health issues. 24 The alle-
gations in the FCA case centered upon whether Rockwell submitted
false claims for payment by lying about its environmental perform-
ance during removal of toxic waste from the plant.25 Mr. Stone filed a
qui tam complaint alleging Rockwell violated the FCA.26
Mr. Stone worked at the Rockwell plant as an engineer from No-
vember 1980 through March 1986.27 During the early 1980s, hazardous
wastes accumulated in a fabricated storage pond inside the plant.28
Over time, the pond began to leak, and the EPA asked the DOE to
close the pond and safely remove and dispose of the waste materials.
Thus, the DOE turned to Rockwell, the manager and operator of the
plant, for a solution. Rockwell creatively proposed mixing the sludge
at the bottom of the pond with cement, forming what it termed "pond-
crete" blocks.29 In theory, the toxic waste would be permanently en-
cased in cement and buried in the Nevada desert.30 Rockwell
convinced the DOE that this plan was safe and effective.
Mr. Stone, however, disagreed with Rockwell. In a 1982 engineering
report, Mr. Stone reviewed the proposed pondcrete system and con-
cluded the proposal would not work due to a flaw in the piping sys-
tem.31 Mr. Stone was concerned the piping might remove the sludge
improperly, creating blocks with an improper sludge/concrete ratio. 32
Despite Mr. Stone's predictions that the proposed piping system
would fail, Rockwell proceeded with the project.33 In 1986, prior to
the actual making of pondcrete, Mr. Stone left his position at
Rockwell and had no further interaction with the pondcrete project. 34
24. U.S. ex. rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 265 F.3d 1157, 1162 (10th Cir. 2001).
25. Id. at 1163-64.
26. Id.
27. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1401.
28. See supra note 13.
29. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1401. The blocks were 3 foot square. The cement mixture was
poured into a plastic lined cardboard box as a temporary frame to hold the pondcrete until it
hardened. See supra note 13.
30. See supra note 13.
31. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1402.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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The project initially succeeded and Rockwell created solid pond-
crete blocks. 35 Accordingly, the Court concluded Mr. Stone's predic-
tion that the piping system was inadequate was wrong.36
However, problems with the pondcrete process soon occurred.
Rockwell ran behind on its sludge-removing project, thereby risking a
reduced award fee for completing the task on schedule.37 At some
point in 1987, in an apparent effort to increase production speed,
Rockwell appointed a new foreman who reduced the amount of ce-
ment used to produce the pondcrete blocks.38 The result was disas-
trous. Many blocks failed to adequately harden, and thus failed to
properly encase the toxic waste. 39
In 1987, Rockwell became aware that some pondcrete blocks were
leaking but did not report the problem to the DOE.40 In May 1988,
the DOE first learned about the pondcrete problems when a
Rockwell employee reported a toxic sludge spill after a pondcrete
container fell and poured liquid waste onto the pavement. 41
In June 1987, more than a year after he left Rockwell, Mr. Stone
went to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) alleging Rockwell
had committed numerous environmental crimes.42 However, only a
minute portion of his allegations related to the pondcrete and most of
the other allegations proved to be incorrect.43 Of the 2,300 pages of
documents Mr. Stone provided to the FBI, only a few pages of one
small engineering report concerned pondcrete. 44 Furthermore, Mr.
Stone did not specifically discuss pondcrete with the FBI agents.45
On June 6, 1989, FBI and agents from the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) executed a search warrant pursuing allegations
that Rockwell received government money for its excellent manage-
ment of the plant despite numerous environmental problems, includ-
ing its pondcrete block leaks "due to an inadequate waste-concrete
35. Id.
36. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1404.
37. The Court extensively discussed Rockwell's reduction in the amount of cement after it had
successfully made blocks. Id. at 1401-06, 1409. According to the Court, due to the intentional
reduction of cement quantity, the pondcrete blocks failed to solidify because of an improper
cement/sludge ratio. Id.
38. Id. at 1404 (the jury found that Rockwell submitted false statements for the periods cover-
ing the pondcrete allegations, from April 1, 1987 to September 30, 1988).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1402. Although Rockwell became aware in October 1986, DOE was not told until
May 1988. Id.
41. See id.; supra note 13.
42. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1402.
43. Rockwell Automation, Inc. v. U.S., 70 Fed. Cl. 114, 115-116 (Fed. Cl. 2006).
44. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1402. See supra note 13.
45. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1402.
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mixture. ' 46 Only after news of the search warrant filled the media did
Mr. Stone file his qui tam suit under the FCA.47 As part of filing the
qui tam, Mr. Stone provided the government with a confidential dis-
closure statement containing all of the material evidence he possessed
supporting the allegations. The statement indicated Mr. Stone pre-
dicted the piping mechanism would cause the pondcrete system to
fail.48
The government reviewed the allegations and initially declined to
intervene in Mr. Stone's qui tam.49 After learning new information,
the government joined the suit in November 1996, filing a joint
amended complaint in Mr. Stone's suit stating the insolidity of pond-
crete was due to an incorrect cement/sludge ratio.50 The thrust of the
FCA allegation was that Rockwell knew in 1987 the pondcrete blocks
were insolid, but failed to report it to the DOE until mid-1988.
51
Meanwhile, Rockwell claimed to have excellent environmental per-
formance, resulting in award fee bonuses of over one million dollars.
52
A flaw in the piping system was not alleged in the amended com-
plaint, and counsel for the government and for Mr. Stone accentuated
the incorrect ratio to the jury during arguments before the district
court.53 The final pretrial order also stated the insolidity was caused
by an incorrect cement/sludge ratio. 54
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1403.
48. Id.
49. The government initially informed the district court that it lacked information necessary to
make an informed decision as to whether Rockwell concealed knowledge that pondcrete blocks
had failed to harden and were leaking. See supra note 13. In response, the court unsealed the
case and ordered Mr. Stone and his attorneys to proceed with the case in the absence of the
government. Id. Meanwhile, Rockwell had filed a lawsuit in the Court of Federal Claims alleging
that the DOE Headquarters improperly reduced award fees based upon political pressure during
time periods outside of when Rockwell allegedly concealed its knowledge. Id. When the attorney
for DOJ in the Claims Court case suddenly died, the Civil Fraud Division attorneys were asked
to assist in defending the case. Id. Mr. Hesch took depositions of several Rockwell employees,
who admitted that they had prior knowledge of leaking pondcrete and had told Rockwell man-
agement prior to May 1988. Id. Based upon this and other new information, DOJ sought and was
allowed by the court to intervene in Mr. Stone's case. See id.; Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1399.
50. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1404. The joint complaint contained claims beyond those regarding
pondcrete, but the pondcrete claims were the key claims concerning Mr. Stone's position as a
relator. See supra note 13.
51. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1404.
52. At trial, DOJ presented evidence that $1,390,775.80 of the total award fees paid to
Rockwell during that time period were attributable to the category "environmental, safety, and
health." See supra note 13. The jury ultimately awarded the government that exact amount,
which was tripled by the court, as required under the FCA. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1404.
53. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1404.
54. Id.
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The jury found Rockwell submitted false claims relating to the
pondcrete allegations from April 1, 1987 to September 30, 1988 in vio-
lation of the FCA.55
After losing the FCA case, Rockwell filed a post verdict motion
stating Mr. Stone was not an original source and asking the district
court to dismiss Mr. Stone's claims.5 6 Mr. Stone alleged leaking pond-
crete would be the result of a faulty piping system, but the jury found
the pondcrete leaked because of the incorrect cement/sludge ratio.57
The parties stipulated that the facts underlying the fraudulent
claims concerning pondcrete had been publicly disclosed prior to Mr.
Stone filing his qui tam case.5 8 Thus, Mr. Stone conceded he needed to
meet the requirements of the FCA's original source exception to be
eligible for a share under the FCA.59 The issue of whether Mr. Stone
was an original source went through several appeals prior to the Su-
preme Court granting certiorari to determine whether Mr. Stone was
an original source. 60
B. The Holding of Rockwell
After outlining the facts, the Court held the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction regarding Mr. Stone. 61  However,
Rockwell's liability was not at issue; thus, regardless of the Court's
decision with respect to Mr. Stone, Rockwell still had to pay the gov-
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1401-06, 1409. Rockwell admitted reducing the amount of cement
in the pondcrete blocks. Id. at 1404.
58. Id. at 1405.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1403-1405 (explaining the procedural history of the case). Prior to trial and again
after trial, the district court held that Mr. Stone was an original source under the FCA, entitling
him to a share of the FCA verdict against Rockwell. Id. at 1404-05. After the trial, Rockwell
appealed this decision to the Tenth Circuit. Id. at 1405. The appellate court affirmed the district
court's determination as to his direct and independent knowledge of the false claims, but re-
manded the case to determine whether Mr. Stone had properly disclosed information to the
government prior to filing his qui tam action. Id. See also 31 U.S.C. §3730(e)(4)(B) (2000) (In
addition to possessing direct and independent knowledge to be an original source, the relator
must have also "voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing an action
under this section which is based on the information."). On remand, the district court found that
the 1982 engineering order provided to the FBI was insufficient to satisfy proper disclosure
under the FCA, so Mr. Stone did not qualify for a percentage of the award. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct.
at 1405. The district court found that Mr. Stone had not orally discussed pondcrete with the FBI,
and thus, the only evidence of informing the government was a single document in which Mr.
Stone predicted the piping system would not work. Id. Mr. Stone appealed the district court's
decision to the Tenth Circuit. Id. The appellate court reversed the district court's conclusion,
holding that Mr. Stone had satisfied his burden of persuasion by providing the engineering or-
der. Id. The Court then granted certiorari. Id.
61. Id. at 1412.
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ernment the $4.1 million verdict.62 In short, the Court held Mr. Stone
was ineligible for a reward under the qui tam provisions of the FCA.
63
In reaching this decision, the Court analyzed some, but not all, of
the FCA's public disclosure bar requirements and the original source
exception. In doing so, the Court provided several guiding principles.
A few of these principles resolved minor splits between the lower
courts. However, the most divisive original source exception issues
were neither decided nor addressed by the Supreme Court.
III. THE ISSUES ROCKWELL RESOLVED
Rockwell resolved several issues relating to the FCA's original
source exception and public disclosure bar, pertinent for future qui
tam cases. This section identifies and discusses those issues.
The public disclosure bar and original source exception stem from
the following language of the FCA:
(4)(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this sec-
tion based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in
a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, ad-
ministrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, au-
dit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is
brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is
an original source of the information.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, "original source" means an indi-
vidual who has direct and independent knowledge of the information
on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the
information to the Government before filing an action under this
section which is based on the information. 6
4
Under this statutory scheme, if there is no qualifying public disclosure
under subpart (4)(A) of the FCA, the public disclosure bar does not
apply.65 In other words, the original source exception is not implicated
unless a public disclosure, identified in the statute, occurred before a
relator filed a qui tam suit. Hence, a relator need not satisfy the origi-
nal source rule absent a qualifying public disclosure occurring before a
qui tam suit is filed.66
62. Id. at 1404 ("The jury awarded damages of $1,390,775.80, which the District Court trebled
pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)."). The only issue remaining on appeal was the original source
issue. Id. at 1405.
63. Id. at 1410.
64. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B) (2000) (emphasis added).
65. Under the FCA, a qualifying public disclosure means a "public disclosure of allegations or
transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or
Government [General] Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the
news media .... 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). This article does not analyze that standard.
66. E.g., United States ex rel. Aflatooni v. Kitsap Physicians Servs., 163 F.3d 516, 524 (9th Cir.
1998) (citing United States ex rel. Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1416 (9th Cir. 1992)).
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In Rockwell, the parties stipulated that multiple media reports re-
garding the fraud allegations were released prior to Mr. Stone filing
the qui tam complaint. 67 The parties not only agreed those media re-
ports qualified as public disclosures under the FCA, but also that Mr.
Stone based his qui tam complaint on them. 68 Thus, the Court did not
have occasion to determine the full parameters of the public disclo-
sure bar; its inquiry was limited to whether Mr. Stone qualified as an
original source.
Because the entire issue on appeal depended on whether the courts
had subject matter jurisdiction, the Supreme Court addressed several
different aspects of jurisdiction relating to the original source excep-
tion. First, the Court ruled the original source provision is a "jurisdic-
tion-removing provision" for the relator.69 In other words, neither the
courts nor the parties can waive the original source requirement if a
qualifying public disclosure exists.
The Court next addressed whether the intervention by the govern-
ment, the real party in interest, provided an independent basis for the
relator's jurisdiction. 70 Mr. Stone argued that a different section of the
FCA granted jurisdiction over the government's and the relator's
complaints upon intervention by the government. 71 As discussed be-
low, the Court disagreed. 72
Similarly, the Court noted that eliminating the relator from the case
because he did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements did not re-
move jurisdiction over the government's FCA claims. 73 Rather, the
government could continue with its claims despite the relator's depar-
ture. Thus, the jury verdict in favor of the government (and against
Rockwell) was not disturbed.
Next, because of the jurisdiction-removing nature of the clause, the
Court determined jurisdiction is not tested solely at the filing of the
qui tam complaint. 74 Rather, jurisdiction over the relator must be
maintained throughout the duration of the case. Thus, if the complaint
is amended to drop the relator's only valid original source claim and a
different claim is substituted for which he is not an original source, the
67. See Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1404-05.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1406.
70. Id. at 1410.
71. Id.
72. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1411.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1408.
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second claim is not somehow grandfathered or "smuggled" into the
case.
75
In addition, the Court held the jurisdictional inquiry must be per-
formed on a claim-by-claim basis.76 In other words, if a qui tam com-
plaint contains two completely different types of fraud allegations,
assuming the public disclosure bar applies, the relator must establish
original source status for each claim.77
With these threshold issues decided, the Court addressed whether
the relator met the statutory definition of an original source. The
Court first examined the meaning of the phrase "information on
which the allegations are based," as contained in the original source
statute.78 Before deciding whether a relator had sufficient knowledge,
the Court must first determine what the relator must possess knowl-
edge of in order to satisfy the standard.
The limited inquiry in Rockwell was whether the FCA required the
relator to possess direct and independent knowledge of the informa-
tion contained in his qui tam complaint or the information "on which
the publicly disclosed allegations" are based.79 With little difficulty,
the Court found the statute required direct and independent knowl-
edge of information underlying allegations in the qui tam complaint,
not the information the public disclosure possessed.80
The Court was finally positioned to tackle the heart of the original
source issue: Did the relator possess direct and independent knowl-
edge of the information underlying his qui tam complaint? Although
the Court reached a decision, it failed to establish a standard for fu-
ture cases beyond the narrow scope of the unique facts of this case.
The Court did not define "direct and independent knowledge," de-
spite the circuit split and varying meanings. Rather, the Court deter-
mined that regardless of the meaning, a relator who merely predicted
a possible outcome did not satisfy the original source exception, espe-
cially when his prediction was wrong and the nature of the false state-
ments proven at trial was not based upon such prediction.81
75. See id. at 1410 (describing this as a process of "claim smuggling").
76. Id.
77. See infra Part III.B.
78. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1407. The statute defines "original source" as meaning an individ-
ual who has direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are
based and has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing an action
under this section, which is based on the information. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B) (2000).
79. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1407.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1410.
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In sum, the much-anticipated decision of the Court fell far short of
expectations, and there remains a great need for a uniform standard.
Nevertheless, the decision resolved several issues discussed in detail
below, followed by an examination of the likely implications for future
cases.
A. The Original Source Exception is a Jurisdictional Determination
The FCA states that after a public disclosure of facts occurs, "[n]o
court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section ... un-
less the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person
bringing the action is an original source of the information. '82 The
Supreme Court ruled the public disclosure bar acts as a "jurisdiction-
removing provision" for a relator.83 In other words, original source
status is a threshold jurisdictional issue, and if the relator fails to fulfill
the necessary requirements, he will be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
The Court did not state that a district court had no jurisdiction over
the case if the public disclosure bar is raised or applicable. 84 Rather,
the Court chose careful wording to mean that in situations where the
allegations had been previously disclosed, the relator must meet the
original source exception for a court to maintain jurisdiction over the
relator and his claim. 85 The Court clarified that the only avenue for a
court to retain jurisdiction once the public disclosure bar is triggered is
for the relator to establish himself as an original source under that
particular statutory provision, ruling out any other FCA sections that
would purport to give a court jurisdiction over the relator's claim.86
Because a qualifying public disclosure occurred in Rockwell prior to
the filing of Mr. Stone's qui tam suit, lower courts continued to have
82. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (e)(4)(A) (emphasis added).
83. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1406.
84. Id. at 1411.
85. Id. (providing that "an action originally brought by a private person, which the Attorney
General has joined, becomes an action brought by the Attorney General once the private person
has been determined to lack the jurisdictional prerequisites for suit"). In other words, once a
court determines the relator is not an original source of the information underlying his claim,
jurisdiction over the relator and his claim disappear. Id. at 1401 (stating that "The False Claims
Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733, eliminates federal-court jurisdictions over actions under § 3730 of
the Act that are based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions 'unless the action
is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the
information."'); see also id. at 1405 (asserting that "[tihe issue is ... whether a clear and explicit
withdrawal of jurisdiction withdraws jurisdiction. It undoubtedly does so.").
86. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1406 (providing that this "is surely the most natural way to achieve
the desired result of eliminating jurisdiction over a category of False Claims Act actions - rather
than listing all the conceivable provisions of the United States Code whose conferral of jurisdic-
tion is being eliminated").
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jurisdiction over his claims only if he qualified for the original source
exception.8 7 As discussed below, Mr. Stone did not meet the
definition.88
The Court did not discuss the rights of a relator where a trial court
finds the relator is not an original source. This raises many nettlesome
questions without easy answers. Specifically, what rights, if any, does
the relator in the action have pending appeal? For instance, if the gov-
ernment had already joined the suit and is continuing to proceed, will
the relator be allowed to participate in discovery or other activities
(which can take years) pending appeal? Specifically, what if the defen-
dant and government settle the FCA case before the relator's appeal
is heard?
Normally, a relator has the right to contest a proposed settlement
between the government and the defendant.8 9 However, if lacking ju-
risdiction over the relator means that he cannot further participate in
the FCA action, what happens if the appellate court reinstates the re-
lator after the case is settled?
Because the United States is the real party in interest, arguably it is
a burden to stay proceedings or postpone a settlement pending the
relator's appeals. 90 Yet, many rights of the relator are lost absent a
stay, even if he is later granted a statutory share of the proceeds, plus
attorney fees and costs from the defendant, upon reinstatement. 91
Treating the public disclosure bar and original source exception as ju-
risdiction-removing provisions undoubtedly raises many new and chal-
lenging issues for courts.
87. Id. at 1404-05. Mr. Stone admits that there was a public disclosure and that his qui tam
action was based upon it. Id. at 1405.
88. See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
89. Furthermore, the government may settle over the objection of the relator if there is a
hearing and the court determines that the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730 (c)(2)(B) (2000).
90. Under the FCA, the government may ask the court to restrict the relator's participation in
the litigation if it "would interfere with or unduly delay the Government's prosecution of the
case." 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (c)(2)(C).
91. Because the government is the one that is to pay the relator's share of the proceeds, there
is no concern that the government would have funds to pay the newly reinstated relator. How-
ever, because the relator is also entitled to attorney fees and costs from the defendant, ability to
pay may be a real factor. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (d)(1)-(2). Often, the total amount a defendant
pays depends on how much it may have to pay in attorney fees. See supra note 13.
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B. Government Intervention Does Not Provide
Jurisdiction Over the Relator
If the relator does not qualify as an original source, 92 which
removes the Court's jurisdiction over his claim, the Court clearly
states that government intervention in the suit does not rescue the
relator from procedural disqualification. 93 In short, government inter-
vention does not cure the relator's jurisdictional ills; if the relator does
not qualify as an original source, he will be dismissed from the case.
The Court pointed out that the FCA's provisions contain a "sharp
distinction" between suits initiated by private citizens and those
brought by the Attorney General.94 While the government's interven-
tion provided jurisdiction for its own case, it did not grant jurisdiction
over Mr. Stone's position as a relator.95 The clear language of the
FCA prevents such melding of jurisdiction. Claims under the FCA are
either brought by a citizen or by the Attorney General; government
intervention does not automatically classify a privately brought suit as
one brought by the Attorney General. 96 The relator may not join with
the government when he is not an original source.97
This aspect of the Court's opinion did not materially affect qui tam
cases. The Court reiterated that the original source exception is a ju-
risdictional requirement. Because government intervention does not
save a relator, a defendant will examine the public disclosure bar in all
cases and file a motion to dismiss if it thinks the bar applies. As was
expected even prior to Rockwell, before filing a qui tam suit, regard-
less of how strong of a fraud case exists, a relator and his counsel must
closely examine whether a public disclosure occurred and if the rela-
tor can satisfy the original source exception. Otherwise, they may in-
cur huge litigation costs while aiding the government in FCA cases,
only to be tossed out years later if appellate courts rule they do not
satisfy the exception. 98
92. As stated earlier, a relator need only meet the requirement of an original source if there
had been a qualifying public disclosure prior to filing the qui tam. See supra note 66 and accom-
panying text.
93. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1411 (the Court asserted, "Even assuming that Stone was an origi-
nal source of allegations in his initial complaint, we reject respondents' 'intervention'
argument").
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See Hesch, supra note 5, at 111 n.1 (noting that the relator's counsel in Rockwell incurred
$10 million in attorney fees).
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C. If the Relator is Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction,
the Government's Action Continues as an Action
Brought by the Attorney General
When a relator is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the govern-
ment's FCA claim does not succumb to the jurisdictional fire. Rather,
jurisdiction over the relator is "removed" when a court determines the
relator does not meet the jurisdictional requirement of the statute.99
As in Rockwell, if the government has intervened in the case, whether
the relator is removed does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the
government's claims. 100
At first blush, the wording of the FCA appears to demand that a
claim be brought by either (1) the Attorney General, or (2) a relator
satisfying the original source exception.10 1 Since Mr. Stone was not an
original source, it appears the FCA claim in Rockwell was initially
brought by neither. The Court, however, did not entertain the idea
that the government would fail a jurisdictional inquiry if the relator is
later dismissed.10 2 Rather, once a private person is dismissed from a
case, it becomes an action brought by the Attorney General.10 3
Citing the concept of diversity-jurisdiction cases where courts "have
the authority to cure a jurisdictional defect by dismissing a dispensa-
ble nondiverse party,"'01 4 the Court ruled that dismissal of the relator
merely changes the characterization of the action. The FCA case is no
longer one brought by a failed original source, but reclassified as one
"brought" by the Attorney General.105
Because the government intervened before the relator was dis-
missed, whether this same principle applies in a declined qui tam is
disputed. If the government intervened in a qui tam suit before the
relator was dismissed, the government is allowed to continue the case
uninterrupted by the relator's departure. The Court already stated the
case is treated as though the government brought the suit.10 6
99. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1406. Of course, the dismissal is not fully effective until all appeals
are extinguished.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1411 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (a), (b)).
102. In fact, the Court characterized that possibility as a "bizarre result," which not even the
defendant was willing to suggest. Id.
103. Id. ("an action originally brought by a private person, which the Attorney General has
joined, becomes an action brought by the Attorney General once the private person has been
determined to lack the jurisdictional prerequisites for suit").
104. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1411 (quoting Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541
U.S. 567, 573 (2004)).
105. Id. at 1411-12.
106. Id. at 1411. Thus, the filing of a qui tam by a relator acts to toll the FCA's statute of
limitations, regardless of whether the relator is subsequently dismissed.
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The Rockwell decision does not clarify whether the tolling aspect
applies if the government declines to intervene in the qui tam case
when the relator is dismissed. The FCA allows the government to
elect whether to intervene or allow the relator to proceed alone and
receive a higher award fee. There are many reasons why the govern-
ment may not wish to intervene, and it is not obligated to explain its
actions. For instance, the government has previously declined out of a
desire to preserve resources by allowing the relator to bear the brunt
of litigation costs. 10 7 Accordingly, it is inequitable for a court to dis-
miss the entire action without providing the government an opportu-
nity to join a case.
Such an inequitable result was reached by a district court con-
fronting this issue. 10 8 In Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas, the government de-
clined to intervene and the relator proceeded to trial. 10 9 After the jury
awarded a FCA judgment of $7.5 million, the district court dismissed
the case because the public disclosure bar applied and the relator was
not an original source." 0 The government moved to stay the order to
allow it to intervene, but the court denied the request, stating that it
lacked jurisdiction over the entire case when the relator was dis-
missed."' Rejecting the argument that Rockwell allows the govern-
ment to pick up where the relator left off, the court distinguished
Rockwell because the government intervened in that case.1 2
107. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (c), (d) (2000). See also United States ex rel. Williams v. Bell Helicopter
Textron, Inc., 417 F.3d 450, 455 (5th Cir. 2005) ("The [FCA] statute ... does not require the
government to proceed if its investigation yields a meritorious claim. Indeed, absent any obliga-
tion to the contrary, it may opt out for any number of reasons."); United States ex rel. Chandler
v. Cook County, II1., 277 F.3d 969, 974 n.5 (7th Cir. 2002) ("There is no reason to presume that a
decision by the Justice Department not to assume control of the suit is a commentary on its
merits. The Justice Department may have myriad reasons for permitting the private suit to go
forward including limited prosecutorial resources and confidence in the relator's attorney.");
United States ex reL Berge v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453, 1458 (4th Cir. 1997)
(finding that the Government's decision not to intervene was "not an admission by the United
States that it has suffered no injury in fact, but rather [the result of] a cost-benefit analysis.");
United States ex rel. DeCarlo v. Kiewit/AFC Enters., Inc., 937 F. Supp. 1039, 1047 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) ("Non-intervention does not necessarily signal governmental disinterest in an action, as it
is entitled to most of the proceeds even if it opts not to intervene."). A similar issue arises when
a court refuses to give the government more time to finish its investigation before requiring it to
make a decision to intervene or decline. See supra note 13. Historically, the government declines
the case in those instances but continues with its investigation. Id.
108. United States ex rel. Maxwell v. Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Corp., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1233,
1234-35 (D. Colo. 2007).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1236-37.
2008] UNDERSTANDING THE "ORIGINAL SOURCE EXCEPTION" 17
The result in Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas is clearly wrong. It violates the
spirit and text of the FCA. The Rockwell case supports the opposite
conclusion. In Rockwell, the government initially declined to inter-
vene and the relator proceeded for several years by himself through
counsel.113 Rockwell contested the government's later intervention
through a series of creative arguments, including that Rockwell's own
subjective interpretation of "good cause" for intervention after initial
declination must be applied because it entered into a criminal plea
agreement with the government under the belief that the United
States could not later join the civil qui tam suit.114 The Tenth Circuit,
however, rejected Rockwell's arguments and affirmed the govern-
ment's right to intervene. 115
The right of the government to intervene is not based simply on
policy, but also on a direct statutory entitlement. Specifically, the FCA
contains a provision allowing the government to intervene after ini-
tially declining.116 The Supreme Court had previously outlined the
procedure as follows:
If the Government declines to intervene within the 60-day period,
the relator has the exclusive right to conduct the action, and the
Government may subsequently intervene only on a showing of
"good cause." The relator receives a share of any proceeds from the
action - generally ranging from 15 to 25 percent if the Government
intervenes (depending upon the relator's contribution to the prose-
cution), and from 25 to 30 percent if it does not (depending upon
the court's assessment of what is reasonable) - plus attorney's fees
and costs.
17
Several additional courts have applied this section of the FCA to mo-
tions by the government to intervene after declining. 1' 8 Based upon
113. United States ex. rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 124 F.3d 1194, 1197 (10th Cir. 1997).
114. Id. at 1198-1200.
115. Id.
116. The FCA provides that even after the government declines to intervene in a qui tam
action, the court may still permit the government to intervene at a later date "upon a showing of
good cause." 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3).
117. Vt. Agency of Natural Res v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 769-70 (2000)
(citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4), (c)(3), (d)(1)-(2)).
118. One district court discussed the cases addressing this issue as follows:
Though there is little case law defining 'good cause,' several courts have found that
good cause exists when new and significant evidence is produced during discovery. In-
deed, the legislative history behind § 3730 indicates that the purpose of late interven-
tion is to allow the government to intervene if new evidence, discovered after the first
sixty (60) days of litigation, escalates the magnitude or complexity of the fraud, causing
the government to reevaluate its initial assessment of the case. As interpreted by the
Tenth Circuit, the purpose of § 3730(c)(3) is "to pursue litigation, not dismiss it." None-
theless, even if the court allows a late intervention, the intervention must not limit the
status and rights of the relators.
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the language of the FCA and cases interpreting it, the FCA clearly
allows the relator to initially proceed alone, subject to the government
later joining at any stage of the case.
The Supreme Court in Rockwell relied on a concept of curing a ju-
risdictional defect to reach its decision that the government may pro-
ceed in a qui tam case initiated by the relator who is later dismissed. 119
Accordingly, the Court extended the principle that a real party in in-
terest can substitute for the dismissed party when the court lacks juris-
diction over the dismissed party to FCA cases. Since the government
is the real party in interest,120 Rockwell supports the premise that the
government may still intervene in a declined qui tam case where a
relator is dismissed under the public disclosure bar.
Allowing the government to take over a declined qui tam case if a
relator is pending dismissal or immediately after dismissal conforms
with the correct reading of the FCA.121 Thus, even when the govern-
ment has declined to join a case, courts should ask the government if
it desires to take over the case before dismissing it, or the public may
unintentionally lose its rights.122
United States ex rel. Lam v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 481 F. Supp. 2d 689, 694 (W.D. Tex. 2007)
(citations omitted). In Tenet, the court ruled that the government had not attempted to establish
"good cause" in the case by relying upon newly discovered evidence, but, rather, based upon its
interest "in whether the Relators are entitled to object to or obtain a share of the global Tenet
settlement agreement, because any recovery on the part of the Relators will come out of the
Government's pocket." Id. at 694-695. The ruling allowed good cause to be established in ways
apart from newly discovered evidence. Specifically, the court found good cause to intervene
because "the prejudice which would result to the Government if it is not permitted to intervene
far outweighs the prejudice to the Relators if the Government is permitted to intervene." Id. at
695. The court continued, "Finally, the status and rights of the Relators will not be limited by this
intervention because the Relators still have the possibility of obtaining recovery in the form of a
percentage of the settlement agreement." Id.
119. See supra notes 101 and 102 and accompanying text.
120. See United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d 220 (1st Cir.
2004); United States ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Techs. Corp., 985 F.2d 1148 (2d Cir.
1993); United States ex rel. Laird v. Lockheed Martin Eng'g & Sci. Servs. Co., 336 F.3d 346 (5th
Cir. 2003); United States ex rel. Zissler v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 154 F.3d 870 (8th Cir.
1998); United States ex rel. Rodgers v. Arkansas, 154 F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 1998); United States ex
rel. Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp., 25 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 1994); United States ex rel. Walker v.
R & F Props., Inc., 433 F.3d 1349 (11th Cir. 2005).
121. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (c), (d) (2000).
122. Perhaps the biggest issue affecting the government upon a dismissal of the entire case is
the statute of limitations. By allowing the government to intervene prior to dismissal of the
relator, the government can benefit from the tolling of the statute of limitations as a result of the
relator's complaint. Otherwise, if the dismissal were to take place after the statute of limitations
had expired on some or all of the claims, should the court dismiss the entire case and force the
government to file a separate suit, the defendant would argue that the claims are time-barred.
The author argues that this could not have been the intent of Congress when it allowed a relator
to pursue a FCA claim on behalf of the government.
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D. Original Source Jurisdictional Analysis Must Be
Conducted at Every Stage of the Litigation
The Court ruled the jurisdictional qualification for the original
source exception continues throughout litigation.123 The analysis can-
not, and does not, stop at the relator's original complaint; jurisdiction
is determined with each amended complaint throughout the litigation,
including the pretrial order.124 As allegations evolve throughout the
case, a court must reevaluate whether the relator continues to satisfy
the original source exception, thus maintaining the FCA's jurisdic-
tional requirement. If a claim that maintained proper jurisdiction is
withdrawn or dismissed, that claim must be replaced by another claim
that satisfies the FCA's jurisdictional requirement. Otherwise, the re-
lator, or certain claims of the relator, will be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
The fluidity of litigation affords many opportunities for amend-
ments to the claims and allegations against the defendant. In
Rockwell, Mr. Stone's allegations shifted during the course of the liti-
gation.125 Thus, the question became: If the relator alleged a claim in
the initial complaint for which he qualified as an original source but,
for tactical reasons, that claim was altered sufficiently such that he was
not an original source of the amended allegations, would jurisdiction
continue or be removed? The Court answered that question in the
negative; jurisdiction is removed because original source status must
be established at every stage of the case.126
The FCA does not state that allegations forming the basis for juris-
diction are limited to those in the original complaint, and the Court
declined to interpret the Act to include such a limitation. 2 7 While Mr.
Stone's initial complaint in the district court potentially could have
stated claims providing jurisdiction over him, the complaint as
amended, culminating in the final pretrial order, alleged the insolid
pondcrete was the result of an improper cement/sludge ratio, not the
faulty piping to which Mr. Stone directed the government. 28 The
123. Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1397, 1409 (2007). Although the Court
may have retained jurisdiction over Stone's initial claim, he did not satisfy the original source
exception under the pretrial order, which superseded all other allegations. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1403-05.
126. Id. at 1408.
127. Id.
128. "Respondents clarified their allegations even further in a statement of claims which be-
came part of the final pretrial order... The statement of claims again did not mention the piping
problem asserted by Stone years earlier." Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1404. "Stone did not have direct
and independent knowledge of the information upon which his allegations were based..." Id. at
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Court determined Mr. Stone was not an original source of the allega-
tions presented at trial.129 Therefore, he was not entitled to a share of
the proceeds under the FCA. 130
An ongoing jurisdictional inquiry increases the likelihood of a
strained, rather than cooperative, relationship between the govern-
ment and relator. In Rockwell, the relator agreed to amend the com-
plaint to streamline the case for trial. The decision worked as the jury
returned a verdict for the plaintiffs-finding that Rockwell violated
the FCA for eighteen months. 131 However, this decision ultimately
failed the relator because he was ineligible to receive a reward from
the government. 32
This finding will likely have lasting consequences in future qui tam
cases, which make up more than sixty percent of all FCA cases pur-
sued by the government. 133 The issue is farther reaching than whether
co-plaintiffs can get along and share information. Rather, if the relator
believes the government will drop or significantly alter his jurisdic-
tion-bearing claim in favor of a streamlined trial-one which presents
only the strongest claims-he may decline to combine his claim with
the government's.
The relator may maintain his broader allegations while the govern-
ment tries to streamline the case for trial, slowing litigation as joint
plaintiffs move in different tactical directions. Thus, courts will face
difficult decisions, including whether to allow the government, the real
party in interest, to amend the complaint over the objection of the
relator, or to provide the jury with two separate claims and sets of
instructions for closely related claims.
The government will likely want to shape the allegations for trial.
Thus, the government may modify a claim to fit the evidence obtained
during discovery. In other words, the government may determine it
does not need to rely upon information supplied by the relator be-
cause it obtained documents or testimony from the defendant during
discovery. In fact, it often makes sense for the government not to call
1410. In this case, it is apparent that Mr. Stone lacked direct and independent knowledge regard-
ing any fraud relating to pondcrete regardless of the final pretrial order because his only allega-
tion was that the piping system did not work, and the Court found his prediction was wrong. Id.
at 1404.
129. Id. at 1410 ("Stone did not know that the pondcrete failed; he predicted it.").
130. Id. at 1411.
131. Id. at 1404 (providing that the violations occurred April 1, 1987 through September 30,
1988).
132. Actually, it does not appear that Mr. Stone would have prevailed under his original com-
plaint because the Court determined his prediction was wrong. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1403-04.
133. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 6.
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the relator as a witness because the defendant will attempt to show
bias by pointing out the relator-witness stands to gain up to twenty-
five percent of what the jury awards in damages. 134
By eliminating certain factual support, however, the relator may be
concerned a court will discount the information he provided and be
more inclined to find he was not an original source. In fact, the Su-
preme Court noted Mr. Stone was not a witness at trial and none of
the documents he provided to the government were introduced at
trial. 135 Accordingly, although the government would not call the rela-
tor as a witness for the reasons stated above, in light of the Rockwell
decision, relators may always want to be a testifying witness. Thus, a
fight will likely occur between otherwise cooperative co-plaintiffs.
Under the FCA, the relator is allowed to call witnesses at trial un-
less the government convinces the court it would be disruptive. 136 The
relator may call himself to testify and seek to admit every shred of
evidence of which he has direct and independent information, regard-
less of whether it might confuse the jury or be cumulative, in order to
bolster his original source status. This certainly will lead to disputes
between co-plaintiffs regarding what evidence to present at trial.
When the government declines to intervene on one of multiple
claims raised by the relator in the qui tam complaint, the relator has
the right to proceed alone on the declined claim. 37 Because the rela-
tor cannot afford the risk of losing a jurisdiction-bearing claim, he is
less likely post-Rockwell to drop a declined claim. In those situations,
however, a court may bifurcate the intervened and the declined claims
into separate trials.138
Thus, the ruling in Rockwell heightened the prospects for extended
trials and multiple trials for related claims.
134. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2000) (providing that the relator generally is entitled to be-
tween fifteen percent and twenty-five percent of the recovery when the government joins the
case).
135. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1404.
136. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (c)(2)(C) (providing that the government may ask the court to restrict
the relator's participation in the litigation if it "would interfere with or unduly delay the Govern-
ment's prosecution of the case").
137. The government can choose in which claims to intervene or decline. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730
(c), (d). If the government declines to intervene in a claim, the relator has the right to proceed
on it. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (c)(3). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42, a court may order a
separate trial of any type of claim including a counterclaim "for convenience, to avoid prejudice,
or to expedite and economize." FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b). In Mr. Stone's initial qui tam complaint,
he alleged that Rockwell also lied about plutonium being in the ductwork, and the government
declined that claim. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1402. The district court bifurcated that claim and it
was stayed pending the outcome of the intervened claims. See id. at 1404; supra note 13.
138. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (c), (d).
22 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
E. One Claim that Satisfies the Jurisdictional Qualification
Does Not Allow the Relator to Bring Insufficient
Claims in the Same Action
The Rockwell Court ruled that although one of the relator's claims
satisfies the original source exception, jurisdiction does not necessarily
exist over a different claim in the same qui tam suit. 39 A jurisdictional
evaluation must be done on a claim-by-claim analysis, preventing a
relator from asserting unrelated claims for which he is not an original
source. Due to this ban against what the Court termed "claim smug-
gling," 140 "'[t]he plaintiff's decision to join all of his or her claims in a
single lawsuit should not rescue claims that would have been doomed
• . .if they had been asserted in a separate action.' "141 Rather, the
relator must have direct and independent knowledge of each type or
category of claim he asserts.
Mr. Stone argued that even if he was not an original source over the
claim that Rockwell lied about pondcrete blocks leaking, he was an
original source for purposes of his qui tam action because he had di-
rect and independent knowledge that Rockwell also lied about its
practice of disposing of waste through spray irrigation. 142 There were
two flaws with this argument. First, the jury rejected the allegation
that Rockwell violated the FCA through its spray irrigation prac-
tices.143 Second, a claim regarding concealing improper techniques for
spraying liquid waste on fields is not the same as a claim regarding
reducing the amount of cement in pondcrete and lying about blocks
being insolid and leaking hazardous waste onto the parking lots in
which they were stored.
Rejecting the idea that original source status can be obtained
through totally unrelated claims, the Court held the relator must be
the original source of each fraud claim. 144 In other words, when a
prior public disclosure occurred, a relator cannot simply combine alle-
139. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1410.
140. Id.
141. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Merena v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 205 F.3d 97, 102
(3d Cir. 2000)).
142. See id. at 1404 n.4; supra note 13.
143. The spray irrigation allegations were for the period of time prior to the pondcrete allega-
tions, and the jury found that the violations of the FCA did not occur then. See supra note 13.
Thus, because the only time period when violations of the FCA were found were related to the
time period when Rockwell allegedly lied regarding pondcrete, it is clear that the jury did not
determine that Rockwell violated the FCA regarding spray irrigation.
144. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1410.
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gations failing to satisfy the original source exception with those that
meet it.145
Although this aspect of the decision may appear instinctive, a court
examining future qui tam matters must understand the scope and
meaning of the claim-by-claim approach announced by the Supreme
Court. Applying a claim-by-claim standard does not disqualify a rela-
tor from bringing broad allegations of an overall fraudulent scheme,
such as Medicare upcoding allegations. 146 In other words, the relator
need not have direct and independent knowledge of all of the facts or
false claims comprising a fraud scheme.
For instance, a coding clerk working for a large hospital may attend
a meeting in which all of the clerks are instructed to upcode claims on
the Medicare reimbursement forms. The manager might give the clerk
an example of a Medicare patient who has bronchitis and should be
billed one code level higher than the treatment, i.e. billed for pneumo-
nia. That clerk has direct and independent knowledge of a scheme to
upcode Medicare billings.
Assume the clerk calls a government hotline and tips off the gov-
ernment that the hospital is upcoding. During its investigation, the
government discovers the hospital was also paying kickbacks to doc-
tors who referred patients to the hospital. The media somehow learns
of the allegations and publishes a story identifying the two allegations.
The hospital coding clerk reads the article in the paper and his at-
torney files a qui tam lawsuit on his behalf, alleging two claims against
the hospital: (1) upcoding, and (2) kickbacks. After the case is un-
sealed, the hospital files a motion to dismiss the relator based upon
the public disclosure bar. The relator argues that he meets the original
source exception.
The proper analysis of the original source exception, based upon
Rockwell's claim-by-claim approach, is to evaluate both claims sepa-
rately. In the first instance, the clerk will satisfy the original source
145. Id.
146. The author worked on several upcoding cases while at the Department of Justice. Upcod-
ing is the term used when a hospital knowingly selects a code one or more levels above what the
true diagnosis would support. Medicare provides all hospitals with a manual that lists every
treatment that is eligible for reimbursement when a hospital or doctor treats a patient eligible for
Medicare. The manual assigns a code for each treatment, and Medicare pays a fixed amount for
each code. Essentially, Medicare pays the average cost for each type of treatment as a fixed rate.
The hospital receives that amount regardless of whether it actually costs more or less for that
particular treatment. It is presumed that, in the long run, the hospital will break even. Naturally,
the payment for treating a cold or bronchitis is less than treating pneumonia. There are many
graduating codes and fee payments relating to each type of illness. Coding clerks are required to
examine the patient charts and select the Medicare code which best meets the diagnosis and
description written in the chart by the treating doctor.
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exception regarding the upcoding claim. Clearly the clerk, who at-
tended the meeting in which all clerks were instructed to upcode and
later participated in upcoding numerous bills to Medicare, has direct
and independent knowledge of the scheme. It is not necessary for the
clerk to know of every instance of the fraud within the same plan. 147
The "claim" is that the hospital engaged in a scheme to upcode.
However, the kickbacks allegation is unrelated to the upcoding
claim. It is entirely different, involving the hospital asking doctors to
refer patients to the hospital, and paying them a referral fee, which is
prohibited by Medicare rules. In this situation, the relator did not
have any first-hand knowledge of the kickback scheme. Rather, his
knowledge is based on what he read in the newspaper. This is the
exact type of situation the public disclosure bar is designed to prevent.
That he is an original source for upcoding will not establish him as an
original source for the kickbacks. Accordingly, the court should find
the relator is an original source for upcoding, but not for kickbacks,
and dismiss his kickback claim. 148
The claim-by-claim analysis evaluates each broad allegation, not
every minute detail within a claim. 149 Accordingly, the relator may
appropriately report that a company has committed fraud, leaving the
specific details for trial. If the relator's broad allegations meet the ju-
risdictional burden, a court maintains jurisdiction over that broad
claim. However, the relator may not bring an unrelated claim in the
face of the public disclosure bar unless he is also an original source for
that claim.
F. Allegations that Must be Based Upon the Relator's
Information are the Relator's Claims
Prior to Rockwell, a few courts were confused about what the rela-
tor must personally know if a public disclosure occurred to satisfy the
147. Thus, the clerk would not need to know of every instance in which other clerks also
upcoded or even every type of procedure that was upcoded. Generally, when a hospital engages
in an upcoding scheme, it upcodes thousands of codes over many years resulting in millions of
dollars in loss to the government. If the courts were to demand that the relator must have direct
knowledge of every instance within the same fraud scheme it would render the FCA useless, as
relators would not step forward. The government is enticing relators with direct and independent
knowledge of fraud schemes to step forward because it needs the inside information to prove the
fraud. Often, a relator can supply inside knowledge, such as what was spoken at a meeting,
which the government might not otherwise be able to obtain. In other words, government law-
yers and accountants can readily determine the amount of damages, but they often need to rely
upon the relator to help establish the scienter required under the FCA.
148. Of course, the government may still proceed with the kickback claim.
149. See infra Part III.B (providing that it is sufficient if a relator has direct and independent
knowledge of an essential element of the claim).
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original source exception: the allegations in the qui tam complaint or
the allegations in the public disclosure. 50 It is nonsensical to require
that a relator have firsthand knowledge of publicly disclosed fraud.
According to the Court:
It is difficult to understand why Congress would care whether a re-
lator knows about the information underlying a publicly disclosed
allegation (e.g., what a confidential source told a newspaper re-
porter about insolid pondcrete) when the relator has direct and in-
dependent knowledge of different information supporting the same
allegation (e.g., that a defective process would inevitably lead to in-
solid pondcrete)., 5 '
The Court found an individual qualifies as an original source when
he has "direct and independent knowledge of the information on
which the allegations are based," meaning the information underlying
the relator's claims.1 52 Thus, the relator's allegations must be based on
his own knowledge; he need not have independent knowledge of the
public disclosure. 53
Once a public disclosure is made (which was stipulated in
Rockwell), the relator's ability to bring the case depends on whether a
claim is based on his own direct and independent knowledge of the
allegations in the complaint. The only remaining question is the level
of information needed to satisfy the standard; this question is ad-
dressed below. 154
G. Mere Guesses Cannot Qualify as Direct and
Independent Knowledge
Rockwell's violations of the False Claims Act occurred during 1987
and 1988, well after Mr. Stone stopped working for Rockwell in
1982.155 Therefore, the only hands-on involvement or direct knowl-
edge Mr. Stone had regarding the false claims Rockwell submitted in
violation of the FCA was his prediction in 1982 that the piping system
would likely fail. This prediction was made five years before the con-
150. See United States ex rel. Laird v. Lockheed Martin Eng'g & Sci. Servs., Co., 336 F.3d 346,
353 (5th Cir. 2003) (describing the circuit split).
151. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1407-08.
152. Id. at 1407 (emphasis added).
153. Id.
154. See infra Part III.B.
155. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1409-10. "The only false claims ultimately found by the jury ...
involved false statements with respect to environmental, safety, and health compliance over a
one-and-a-half-year period between April 1, 1987, and September 30, 1988.... [Tihe only perti-
nent problem with respect to this period of time for which Stone claimed to have direct and
independent knowledge was insolid pondcrete." Id.
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duct occurred for which Rockwell was found liable. 156 The Supreme
Court had little difficulty finding Mr. Stone was not an original source
because his prediction amounted to a guess. 157
Mr. Stone predicted Rockwell's pondcrete plan would fail because
of a possible problem in the piping system's removal of sludge.158 This
estimate was made in the planning stage-long before the system was
built. In fact, Mr. Stone left the plant before the piping system was
assembled and had no idea whether Rockwell built it according to the
preliminary plans he reviewed in 1982. In any event, the jury con-
cluded Rockwell violated the FCA by lying about its knowledge that
pondcrete blocks were leaking and continuing to claim its environ-
mental performance deserved award fee bonuses.1 59 The government
argued Rockwell violated the FCA because it lied about the pond-
crete being insolid and leaking, not because the piping system was
faulty.1 60
According to the Court, Mr. Stone was unaware "the pondcrete was
insolid ... he did not know that Rockwell would fail to remedy the
defect; he did not know that the insolid pondcrete leaked ... he did
not know that Rockwell made false statements to the Government
regarding pondcrete storage. ' 161 In fact, Rockwell succeeded in creat-
ing solid pondcrete blocks after Mr. Stone had predicted the process
would fail. 162 It was only after Rockwell reduced the amount of ce-
ment that the pondcrete blocks began leaking. Therefore, when
Rockwell's failure to make solid pondcrete blocks was discovered, the
failure was not for a reason Mr. Stone knew about or could reasonably
foresee. 163 In short, Stone's prediction for system failure did not come
to fruition, and he had no way of having direct knowledge about the
insolid and leaking pondcrete. He "did not know that the pondcrete
failed; he predicted it.'' 164 Moreover, he was never in a position to
know Rockwell lied about leaking pondcrete, which was the crux of
the FCA case.
156. Id. at 1401-02.
157. Id. at 1410.
158. Id. at 1402. Stone's engineering order stated that he "foresaw that the piping system...
would not properly remove the sludge." Id.
159. Id. at 1401, 1404.
160. Id. at 1404.
161. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1410. He had no knowledge of the misconduct for which Rockwell
was found liable, i.e. concealing its knowledge from DOE that the pondcrete blocks were leaking
toxic waste in 1987 and 1988.
162. Id. at 1404.
163. Id. Again, the reason was that Rockwell reduced the amount of cement. Id. at 1401-06,
1409.
164. Id. at 1410.
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According to the Court, predictions not founded in direct and inde-
pendent knowledge do not qualify as direct and independent knowl-
edge. 65 Because Mr. Stone was not in a position to have direct and
independent knowledge of the facts which rendered Rockwell's bonus
claims false, there was no possibility he met any definition of the origi-
nal source exception to the FCA. Mere guesses do not qualify as di-
rect and independent knowledge of FCA allegations.
This case contained such unusual facts that its usefulness is ex-
tremely limited. However, the Court's holding may have implications
beyond Mr. Stone's situation. Can a prediction satisfy the original
source exception? The Court wisely left that door open by stating:
"Even if a prediction can qualify as direct and independent knowledge
in some cases (a point we need not address), it assuredly does not do
so when its premise of cause and effect is wrong."'' 66
The Court is against allowing would-be relators to qualify as origi-
nal sources through speculation, whether or not accompanied by a
prediction. Speculation allows any individual to make a blind or edu-
cated guess about the existence of a fraudulent scheme. But what if a
prediction happens to be accurate-would an individual meet the test
of an original source?
The answer hinges upon the person's knowledge. It also depends on
the type of prediction more than on its accuracy. In fact, the Court
noted, "[o]f course a qui tam relator's misunderstanding of why a con-
cealed defect occurred would normally be immaterial as long as he
knew the defect actually existed.1167 In other words, it was not the
prediction that mattered to the Court so much as what it was based
on. The Court grasped that a person might have significant direct and
independent knowledge of facts supporting a fraud allegation, but be
wrong in predicting some of the results. Such a wrong prediction
would not sweep away the otherwise proper direct and independent
knowledge of the underlying fraud.
An example could include a hospital administrator who told a
group of employees to upcode bills submitted to Medicare. Assume
the hospital carried out the fraudulent scheme. At this point, the em-
ployee could only predict the hospital actually submitted false invoices
in line with its scheme. 168 Of course, there would be little reason for
the hospital administrator to ask its employees to upcode the forms if
165. Id.
166. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1410.
167. Id.
168. Recall that the relator must only meet the definition of an original source if there had
been a prior public disclosure of the fraud allegations. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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the hospital was not submitting them to the government for payment.
Thus, the prediction makes sense. Its accuracy is not the linchpin.
In this setting, the fired employee's knowledge is precisely the type
which satisfies the original source exception. It is based upon direct
and independent knowledge of facts underlying the fraud. Thus, his
prediction that the hospital was carrying out a scheme orchestrated by
the administrator is not a blind guess. He was told of a plan to put a
fraud scheme in place. He would provide valuable information about
the fraud, well worthy of receiving a share of the recovery.
There are undoubtedly many instances where a prediction makes
up part of a relator's claim of fraud; accuracy should not be the litmus
test. Rather, the FCA looks to the strength of the relator's direct and
independent knowledge of an essential element of the fraud allega-
tions. Such an analysis is best made on a case-by-case basis.
IV. ADDRESSING UNRESOLVED ISSUES
After working through threshold issues, the Court was finally
poised to tackle whether Mr. Stone actually qualified as an original
source. The groundwork was laid to address the circuit split-the rea-
son the Court accepted the case-and establish a standard for evaluat-
ing the original source exception to the FCA's public disclosure bar.
Unfortunately, the unusual facts of the case did not lend themselves to
the Court clarifying the proper analysis for the original source excep-
tion. Rather, it was clear Mr. Stone was unable to meet any standard
used by any circuit court of appeals. In other words, the Court simply
ruled Mr. Stone could not possibly be an original source. 169 It did not
provide any meaningful guidance as to which, if any, of the competing
standards were correct. At most, the Court held that guesses or inac-
curate predictions are insufficient for a relator to be an original
source.
170
Thus, circuits remain split; a uniform standard is desperately
needed. Many courts apply a gateway analysis, 171 but use a combina-
tion of two-,172 three-, 173 or four-174 prong approaches for evaluating
169. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1410. Specifically, the Court did not address what is necessary to
satisfy direct and independent knowledge. Id. Nor did it explain what level of knowledge is
required to meet the exception. Id.
170. See supra Part II.G.
171. See Hesch, supra note 5, at 123 n.78 (describing the Sixth Circuit's use of a series of
gateway questions).
172. See id. at 123 n.79 (describing the Seventh Circuit's use of two questions and the D.C.
Circuit's two-step approach).
173. See id. at 123 n.80 (describing the approach of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits).
174. See id. at 123-24 n.81 (describing the approach of the Tenth and Eighth Circuits).
[Vol. 7:1
2008] UNDERSTANDING THE "ORIGINAL SOURCE EXCEPTION" 29
direct and independent knowledge, the lynchpin of the original source
exception. 175 Even then, they apply different meanings to the same
statutory language when addressing the direct and independent
knowledge requirement. 176 Additionally, courts lack uniformity on a
related question: What type and extent of knowledge must a private
person possess to qualify as an original source? Most courts fail to
directly address this question. 77
Because there is a decidedly dramatic circuit split on the basic
framework used to analyze the original source exception, cases with
similar facts receive different treatment under the same federal stat-
ute. Thus a relator must engage in forum shopping to find a sympa-
thetic jurisdiction applying lower standards for meeting the original
source exception. Accordingly, a uniform standard is needed.
This section proposes standards for courts to apply to all original
source exception disputes. It lays out a flowchart (or gateway) to aid
courts in applying the standards consistently and efficiently.
A. The Meaning of "Direct and Independent Knowledge"
The FCA removes jurisdiction from a court over a relator's claim
when a qualifying public disclosure precedes filing his qui tam com-
plaint, unless he qualifies as an original source. 178 The operative lan-
guage of the statute requires a relator have "direct and independent
knowledge" of the information forming the primary basis for his alle-
gation that the defendant knowingly submitted or caused to submit
false claims to the government.179 Thus, the most critical inquiry is
whether the relator possessed direct and independent knowledge of
the fraud scheme.
The phrase "direct and independent knowledge" under the original
source exception requires two discrete inquiries: (1) Does the relator
have "direct" knowledge of an essential element of the FCA allega-
tions; and (2) Is his knowledge "independent" of the public
disclosure?
"Direct" knowledge of information upon which allegations are
based is defined in a variety of ways. 180 Relying on a dictionary defini-
175. The existence of varying standards leads to forum shopping. The FCA permits nation-
wide jurisdiction and has generous venue provisions. See 31 U.S.C. §3730(3)(4)(A)-(B) (2000).
176. See Hesch, supra note 5, at 129-132.
177. Id. at 134-140.
178. See supra Part II.A.
179. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
180. See United States ex rel. Laird v. Lockheed Martin Eng'g & Sci. Servs., Co., 336 F.3d 346,
355-56 (5th Cir. 2003); United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645,
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tion, the Fifth Circuit concluded that direct means "knowledge de-
rived from the source without interruption or gained by the relator's
own efforts rather than learned second-hand through the efforts of
others.' 181 This definition closely captures the purpose of the section
because it distinguishes between one who directly obtains information
from one who receives information through the efforts of others. 182
Restating this standard to incorporate the full meaning of the FCA,
the term direct knowledge means: knowledge derived directly from the
source or that is gained by the relator's own efforts rather than through
the efforts of others.
In light of the purpose of the FCA, the most accurate definition of
"independent" knowledge is that knowledge must not be derived from
or dependent upon the public disclosure itself'183 This satisfies the pur-
pose without opening the gate too wide. In other words, under this
standard, even if a person claims that knowledge gained by reading an
indictment gave him "direct" knowledge, he could not be credited
with "independent" knowledge because he derived the information
from a public disclosure.184
Properly read, the direct and independent knowledge component of
the original source exception requires the relator to possess knowl-
edge derived directly from the source or gained by the relator's own
efforts rather than through the efforts of others, and he must have
independent knowledge not derived from or dependent upon the pub-
lic disclosure itself.
656 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Pruden-
tial Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1160 (3d Cir. 1991).
181. Laird, 336 F.3d at 355 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UN-
ABRIDGED 640 (3d ed. 1961)).
182. The purpose of setting a single standard is to provide guidance to the courts and foster
uniform decisions. See Hesch, supra note 5, at 128-29. The author's proposed definition best
captures the meaning of the various definitions of the term "direct." However, the author is not
stating that each of the ways the federal circuits have defined the term "direct" is necessarily
wrong. Rather, using a uniform definition promotes judicial economy and best ensures uniform
results.
183. This definition best captures the meaning of the various ways of defining the term "inde-
pendent." See Hesch, supra note 5, at 129-30. The author is not stating that each of the ways the
various circuits have defined the term "independent" are necessarily wrong. However, using a
uniform definition promotes judicial economy and best ensures uniform results.
184. The FCA was amended in 1943 to provide that there would be no jurisdiction over qui
tam suits "whenever it shall be made to appear that such suit was based upon evidence or infor-
mation in the possession of the United States, or any agency, officer or employee thereof, at the
time such suit was brought." Minn. Ass'n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health Sys. Corp., 276
F.3d 1032, 1039 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing 31 U.S.C. § 232(C) (1946); S. REP. No. 99-345, at 12
(1946)). "The provision was explained as an attempt to curtail parasitical suits in which the in-
former 'rendered no service' to the government." Id. at 1041 (citing 89 CONG. REC. 10846
(1943)). The author's definition provides this protection.
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B. The Level of Information Required
The correct definition of direct and independent information is
alone insufficient to properly evaluate whether a relator meets the
original source exception. A court must also adopt a standard address-
ing the level of information required for direct and independent
knowledge. Specifically, is it sufficient to directly know just one fact
supporting the allegations or must a relator have independent knowl-
edge of every fact needed to prove a FCA claim?
The Rockwell case failed to provide much direction regarding the
amount or type of information necessary to satisfy the original source
exception. Although the Court did not address this precise question,
language from the decision provides some insight. When addressing
whether the relator's information relates to his knowledge of allega-
tions in the complaint or in the public disclosure, the Court stated:
It is difficult to understand why Congress would care whether a re-
lator knows about the information underlying a publicly disclosed
allegation (e.g., what a confidential source told a newspaper re-
porter about insolid pondcrete) when the relator has direct and inde-
pendent knowledge of different information supporting the same
allegation (e.g., that a defective process would inevitably lead to in-
solid pondcrete). 185
Thus, the Court indicated that a relator need not know every fact sup-
porting a FCA violation. This language contemplates that another
person might have different information than that which the relator is
relying upon to support the allegations in his complaint. Accordingly,
the Court did not demand the relator possess knowledge of all facts
supporting the FCA violation alleged in his complaint. 8 6
Therefore, the remaining question is: What level of knowledge must
the relator actually possess to qualify as an original source? By analyz-
ing the plain language of the original source exception, the graduated
knowledge standard built into the FCA, and evaluating the cases dis-
cussing the issue,18 7 the phrase "direct and independent knowledge of
the information on which the allegations are based" means: The rela-
185. Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1397, 1407-08 (2007) (emphasis added).
186. Id at 1407. Prior to Rockwell, two circuits had also adopted a "third prong," where the
relator not only had to have direct and independent knowledge of his own claim, but also had to
be the one who actually triggered the public disclosure. See United States ex rel. Dick v. Long
Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13, 16 (2d Cir. 1990); United States ex rel. Wang v. FMC Corp., 975
F.2d 1412, 1418 (9th Cir. 1992). After Rockwell, this third prong is no longer an accurate inter-
pretation of the FCA. The Second and Ninth Circuits therefore can no longer appropriately
implement this so-called third prong. This also rules out the "trigger" approach that the Ninth
Circuit had adopted, requiring the relator to trigger a government investigation leading to addi-
tional fraud that has been rejected by the majority of the circuits. See Hesch, supra note 5, at 150.
187. See id. at 134-47.
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tor must have direct and independent knowledge of information that
supports an essential element of the FCA cause of action. In other
words, the relator must possess some direct and independent knowl-
edge of information of the alleged fraud. 188 This language is truest to
the text and purpose of the statute.
C. A Framework for Applying the Original Source Exception
Rockwell left too many questions unresolved. The courts are in
great need for a uniform standard, applicable to all qui tam cases.
Indeed, part of the reason district courts reach inconsistent results is
the lack of a uniform framework to follow when addressing the origi-
nal source exception.
If a qualifying public disclosure exists, the jurisdictional inquiry
mandated by the Supreme Court in Rockwell requires courts to deter-
mine whether the relator meets the FCA's definition of an original
source. Based upon the foregoing analysis, this article proposes the
following standard for courts to adopt: 189
1. Was there a recognized "public disclosure" under 31 U.S.C.
§3730(e)(4)(A) of the False Claims Act?
If yes, go to 2. If no, end of inquiry. The relator may proceed.
2. Was the qui tam complaint "based upon" the public disclosure?
If yes, go to 3. If no, end of inquiry. The relator may proceed.
3. Was the relator an "original source" of information in the com-
plaint that supports an essential element of the FCA cause of
action?
A. Did the relator have "direct" knowledge of such
information?
If yes, go to 3B. If no, end of inquiry. The relator may not
proceed.
B. Did the relator have "independent" knowledge of such
information?
If yes, go to 3C. If no, end of inquiry. The relator may not
proceed.
C. Did the relator "voluntarily provide" such information to
the government prior to filing the qui tam suit?
If yes, the relator may proceed. If no, the relator may not
proceed.
188. See id.
189. The proposed framework is virtually the same as proposed in the author's prior Article.
See id. at 153. Because the Court did not address the key elements of the original source excep-
tion, the Rockwell decision did not materially affect the proposed standard. However, because
there have been additional lower court decisions relating to the original source exception, the
discussion of the meaning of the elements to the proposed framework has been updated and
expanded.
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As suggested by this framework, the "public disclosure bar" only
applies if the answers to both of the first two questions are affirma-
tive-there was a recognized public disclosure1 90 and the qui tam
complaint was "based upon" 191 such public disclosure. If the answer to
either question is "no," then the public disclosure bar does not apply,
and the qui tam relator may proceed.
If the public disclosure bar applies, there is a four-part test to deter-
mine whether the "original source exception" applies. The relator
must possess both "direct" and "independent knowledge" of the infor-
mation on which the allegations are based.192 In addition, the informa-
tion must support an essential element of the FCA cause of action.
Finally, the relator must have voluntarily provided the information to
the government prior to filing the qui tam suit.193
The first two subparts should be addressed together: Did the relator
have both direct and independent knowledge of the information? This
means the relator must possess knowledge directly derived from the
source or gained by the relator's own efforts rather than through the
efforts of others, and he must also have independent knowledge not
derived from (or dependent upon) the public disclosure itself. 194
The next inquiry addresses the level of information required. 195 The
relator's direct and independent knowledge cannot be merely back-
ground information, such as the name of the parties or description of
contracts or programs. Rather, the relator must have direct and inde-
pendent knowledge of information which supports an essential element
of the FCA cause of action. However, this does not require the relator
to possess direct and independent knowledge of the actual misrepre-
sentations made to the government (e.g., an invoice). 196 In addition, as
we can infer from Rockwell, the relator need not be the source of, or
have had a hand in, the public disclosure. 197
Finally, the FCA appears to require the relator to inform the gov-
ernment of the FCA allegations shortly before filing the qui tam
190. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (defining a qualifying public disclosure).
191. The courts are divided over what "based upon" means. Compare United States ex reL
Paranich v. Sorgnard, 396 F.3d 326, 334-35 (3d Cir. 2005) (based upon means "supported by" or
"substantially similar to," and not "actually derived from" the public disclosure), with United
States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1348 (4th Cir. 1994) (based upon
means actually derived from the public disclosure). This article does not fully analyze that
standard.
192. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2000). For a discussion of this standard, see supra Part III.A.
193. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
194. See supra Part III.A.
195. See supra Part III.B.
196. The author evaluated this issue in his prior article. See Hesch, supra note 5, at 134-47.
197. See supra Part IV.
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case.198 In other words, the relator must contact an appropriate gov-
ernment official, such as an Assistant United States Attorney, and in-
form him of the allegations. However, courts have not uniformly
stated how far in advance such notice must be provided. A few courts
have stated it cannot be simultaneous with filing the qui tam.199 At
least one court, however, has disregarded this requirement entirely,
stating that if the relator cooperates with the government, the provi-
sion's intent is satisfied.200 There does not appear to be much value in
demanding any prior notice, but if required, it should be very limited.
In sum, a relator falls into the original source exception if he satis-
fies the proposed gateway criteria.
V. CONCLUSION
As the federal government's primary anti-fraud tool, it is important
to properly understand and apply the standards for one of the most
contested aspects of a qui tam suit: whether a prior qualifying public
disclosure bars a relator's suit. Despite hopes that the Supreme
Court's Rockwell decision would resolve the circuit split and articulate
a uniform "original source exception" standard to the "public disclo-
sure" bar of the False Claims Act, the Court failed to satisfy practi-
tioners litigating FCA cases and federal courts alike. If adopted, this
article's proposed standards and gateway flowchart would lead to uni-
form and appropriate FCA decisions for courts evaluating whether a
relator meets the jurisdictional requirements necessary to satisfy the
original source of information requirement in light of a prior qualify-
ing public disclosure.
198. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B). In Rockwell, the Supreme Court did not address this issue.
Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1410 (holding that "[b]ecause Stone did not have direct and independent
knowledge of the information upon which his allegations were based, we need not decide
whether Stone met the second requirement of original-source status, that he have voluntarily
provided the information to the Government before filing his action").
199. E.g., United States ex rel. Mathews v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853, 865-66 (7th Cir.
1999).
200. United States ex rel. Ervin & Assocs. v. Hamilton Secs. Group, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10
(D.D.C. 2003).
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